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ii

ARGUMENT
I.

WHERE VOEST-ALPINE'S PRIMARY OBLIGATION UNDER THE
LEASE WAS EXPRESSLY DELAYED BY MOUNTAIN STATES'
FAILURE TO DELIVER TIMELY POSSESSION OF THE
BUILDING TO VOEST-ALPINE, VOEST-ALPINE'S OBLIGATION
TO SECURE INSURANCE COVERING MOUNTAIN STATES WAS
LIKEWISE DELAYED.

Because Mountain States failed to deliver possession of the building to VoestAlpine on March 1, 1994, the lease term did not commence and Voest-Alpine's primary
obligation under the lease - the payment of rent - was not triggered. Furthermore, given
the circumstances, nature, and purpose of the lease agreement, Voest-Alpine's obligation
to secure insurance covering Mountain States was likewise delayed until Mountain States
delivered possession of the building. The written terms of the lease are clear and
unambiguous, with paragraph 2 providing:
2.1
Term.
The term of this lease shall be for a period commencing on the 1st
day of March, 1994, and terminating twelve (12) months thereafter, unless
sooner terminated or extended pursuant to any provision hereof.

2.3
Delay in Commencement.
The parties acknowledge time is of the essence of this lease,
particularly with respect to completion of improvements and
commencement of occupancy. Lessor agrees to make improvements
("Lessor Improvements") set forth in Exhibit "C" and its attachments
pursuant to the schedule for completion set forth therein ("Completion
Schedule").... If for any reason Lessor cannot deliver possession of the
premises to Lessee on March 1, 1994, Lessee shall not be obliged to pay

rent. . . until possession is delivered. Possession cannot be delivered until
the completion of item numbers 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 15 of Attachment 1
to Exhibit "C".
(R. 98) While it is clear from the terms of the lease that the lease was to commence on
March 1, 1994 and that Mountain States' failure to deliver possession of the building to
Voest-Alpine on that date delayed commencement of the lease and Voest-Alpine's
obligation to pay rent, it is not clear what effect Mountain States' failure had on VoestAlpine's secondary obligations under the lease. Specifically, the lease is silent as to the
effect of Mountain States' failure on Voest-Alpine's obligation to secure an insurance
policy "insuring [Mountain States] and [Voest-Alpine] against any liability arising out of
the ownership, use, occupancy or maintenance of the premises and all areas appurtenant
thereto." (R. 94) Ordinarily, a contract's silence regarding an important term gives rise
to an ambiguity requiring resort to extrinsic evidence in order to determine the intent of
the parties. See Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) (fully
integrated construction contract found to be ambiguous because contract was silent as to
proper remedy for breach of the contract). In this case, however, the trial court found that
the lease was clear and unambiguous and held that only Voest-Alpine's obligation to pay
rent was delayed as a result of Mountain States' failure to deliver possession of the
building on March 1, 1994.
Voest-Alpine agrees that the written terms of the lease are clear and unambiguous,
2

however Voest-Alpine submits that the trial court's interpretation of the terms of the
contract is erroneous.1 Specifically, Voest-Alpine challenges the trial court's finding that
only Voest-Alpine's obligation to pay rent was delayed by virtue of Mountain States'
failure to complete the required improvements to the building by March 1, 1994. Because
Mountain States retained possession of the building and all rights of control over the
building well beyond March 1, 1994, there is no justifiable basis for finding that VoestAlpine was obligated to secure a bodily injury and property damage insurance policy
insuring Mountain States "against any liability arising out of the ownership, use,
occupancy or maintenance of [Mountain States' building] and all areas appurtenant
thereto[]" effective March 1, 1994. For all intents and purposes, Voest-Alpine's
possession of Mountain States' building was the essence of the lease agreement.
Accordingly, under the circumstances, Voest-Alpine's obligations under the lease,
especially the insurance obligation, were triggered when Voest-Alpine took possession of
the building and commenced paying rent to Mountain States.
When asked to interpret the terms of a contract, this Court has stated that:

l

This Court reviews a trial court's interpretation of an agreement for correctness,
according no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. See Zions First Nat'l Bank
v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988) ("Questions of contract
interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on such
questions we accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of correctness.")
3

we interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable expectations of
the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances,
nature, and purpose of the contract.
Peirce v. Peirce. 2000 UT 7, f 19, 994 P.2d 193.2 See also. Utah State Med. Ass'n v. Utah
State Employees Credit Union. 655 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1982); Nixon & Nixon. Inc. v.
John New & Assocs.. Inc.. 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982). Here, looking to Mountain
States' and Voest-Alpine's lease agreement as whole, and to the circumstances, nature,
and purpose of the lease, the parties reasonably expected that Voest-Alpine's lease
obligations would be triggered when Mountain States delivered possession of the building
to Voest-Alpine.
Because the contract between Voest-Alpine and Mountain States was a lease
agreement, Voest-Alpine's obligations were contingent upon Voest-Alpine's taking
possession of the building. Voest-Alpine contracted with Mountain States for the
exclusive use, possession, and enjoyment of Mountain States building. In return, Voest-

2

In their reply brief, Mountain States challenges Voest-Alpine's citation to Peirce
for basic principles of contract law on the basis that a postnuptial agreement was at issue
in Peirce and not a commercial contract. See Mountain States' Reply Brief at p. 4.
Mountain States' challenge is not well-taken. Voest-Alpine does not rely on the Court's
application of contract law to the particular facts of Peirce. but merely relies on the
Court's statements as to basic contract principles and general rules of contract
interpretation. These rules are equally applicable to post-nuptial agreements and
commercial contracts. Peirce. 2000 UT 7, f 20, 994 P.2d 193 ("Postnuptial agreements
are a type of contract and are generally subject to basic contract principles.").
4

Alpine was obligated to pay rent to Mountain States and insure Mountain States against
liability and damages that might arise as a result of Voest-Alpine's use and possession of
the building. Mountain States' and Voest-Alpine's obligations therefore turn on
possession of the building. So long as Voest-Alpine was in possession of the building
and enjoying the use ai id benefits associated with possession, Voest-Alpine was obligated
to pay rent to Mountain States and insure Mountain States against an> damage that might
result from Voest-Alpine's use and enjoyment of the building. The lease expressly
provided that Voest-Alpine would not be obligated to pay rent until Mountain States
delivered possession of the building.
Further, given the circumstances, i lati ire, and purpose of the lease, it follows that
Voest-Alpine's additional obligations undei the lease, i i ihe insut nice obligating were
likewise contingent upon Voest-Alpine taking possession of the building. So long as
Mountain States retained possession and control of its building, Mountain States quite
rightly bore responsibility for insuring itself and its building. There was no reason for
Voest-Alpine to i;t isi n e a bi lildii lg it did i not possess, did i lot control, and had no rights
over. Furthermore, there was no reason for Voest-Alpine to insure Mountain Stulcs
against damage that might arise out of Mountain States' use and possession of its own
building. The purpose of Voest-Alpine's insurance obligation was to protect Mountain
States from iiiinages that might arise out of Voest-Alpine's use and possession of the
5

building. There is no justifiable basis for the contention that Voest-Alpine was obligated
to procure a bodily injury and property damage public liability insurance policy covering
Mountain States and Mountain States' building where Mountain States failed to deliver
possession of the building to Voest-Alpine. Voest-Alpine would have been conferring a
benefit upon Mountain States while receiving nothing in return.
Mountain States does not dispute that it failed to deliver possession of the building
to Voest-Alpine on March 1, 1994. In fact, as of March 1, 1994, Mountain States had
failed to complete 8 of the 15 requisite improvements to the building. As a result of
Mountain States' failure to satisfy the preconditions to Voest-Alpine's occupancy, VoestAlpine could not use, occupy or otherwise enjoy possession of the building. The fact that
Voest-Alpine's employees were present in the building and assisting Mountain States
with its improvements after March 1, 1994 is irrelevant to Voest-Alpine's insurance
obligations under the lease. After March 1, 1994, the commencement of the lease was
delayed and Mountain States retained exclusive possession and rights of control over its
building. Voest-Alpine had no control over the building. Voest-Alpine's employees
were on the premises with the permission of Mountain States. By permitting VoestAlpine's employees to enter the premises while Mountain States possessed and controlled
the building, Mountain States assumed responsibility for the employees' presence.
Accordingly, Mountain States had the obligation of insuring itself and its building
6

because it had exclusive control over the building. Voest-Alpine had no such obligation
until Mountain States delivered possession of the building.
Additionally, there is no basis for Mountain States' insinuation that Voest-Alpine
began work on its commitments to (iencva Suv :Hor to taking possession of the
building. See Mountain States' Reply Brief at p. 2. Voest-.A Ipine was actual Ij • unable to
begin its work for Geneva Steel until Mountain States had made the requisite
improvements to the building and delivered possession of the building to Voest-Alpine.
To be sure, this is why the lease expressly provided that: "The parties acknowledge that
time is of the essence of this lease, pai ttci ilarl> with respect to completion of
improvements and commencement of occupan, \.

(K. V5j

U - IS no c\ idence

whatsoever that Voest-Alpine was working for Geneva Steel prior to Mountain States'
delivering possession of the building to Voest-Alpine. Mountain States' insinuation is
wholly inappropriate and not supported any evidence in the record.
Mountain States has failed to offer" any legitimate basis to support the trial court's
finding that although Mountain States failed to meet its obligatioiis i indei 1:1 le coi ltract ; i id
deliver possession of the building to Voest-Alpine, Voest-Alpine was nevertheless
obligated to secure a bodily injury and property damage public liability insurance policy
insuring !\lohu

au t

occupancy, and possession

, .;nv liability arising out of Voest-Alpine's use,
• < * -d, I he ti i.il \ mirl s interpretation of the
7

lease runs counter to the reasonable expectations of the parties, looking to the agreement
as a whole and to the circumstances, nature and purpose of the contract. Under the
circumstances, Voest-Alpine's obligations under the lease - including the payment of rent
and securing an insurance policy insuring Mountain States - were triggered when VoestAlpine took possession of the building and received the benefits of occupancy. Until that
point, Mountain States was responsible for insuring the building because it had complete
control over and responsibility for the building.
Because the trial court's interpretation of the lease is incorrect, this Court should
reverse the trial court and enter summary judgment in favor of Voest-Alpine on the basis
that the lease had not commenced at the time of the Bakwoski/Ramirez accident. Further,
because the lease had not commenced at the time of the accident, Mountain States'
insurers properly covered the Bakowski/Ramirez accident.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SET FORTH ITS REASONS
FOR NOT AWARDING THE FULL AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY
FEES SUBMITTED BY VOEST-ALPINE WARRANTS A REMAND.

Because Voest-Alpine prevailed in the trial court, Mountain States was and is
obligated to pay Voest-Alpine's reasonable attorney fees pursuant to paragraph 15.13 of
the lease.3 Voest-Alpine submitted evidence to the trial court establishing that it incurred

Paragraph 15.13 of the lease provides: "Attorney fees. If either party brings an
action to enforce the terms hereof or declare rights hereunder, the prevailing party shall
S

attorney fees totaling $38,380.00 in defending against Mountain States' action. The trial
court, however, only awarded Voest-Alpine $30,206.45 in attorney fees.4 The trial court
did not explain its basis for awarding a lesser amount than that sought by Voest-Alpine.
Because the trial court is required to state its reasons for awarding the lesser amount, the
issue should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to set forth the basis of the
amount of attorney fees awarded to Voest-Alpine.5
This Court is unable to determine whether the trial court's reduction of the fees
sought by Voest-Alpine is reasonable because the trial court offered no basis for the
reduction. The trial court simply crossed out the amount listed in the pleadings drafted by
Voest-Alpine's counsel and wrote in the lesser amount by hand without explanation. (R.
1141; 1138) In Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213, 220 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990), the court stated:
Trial courts should make findings which explain the factors which they
consider relevant in making an attorney fee award, especially when they
reduce the amount from that requested.

be entitled to its reasonable attorney fees." (R. 86)
4

Admittedly, due to counsel's clerical error, Voest-Alpine initially submitted
evidence that its attorney fees totaled only $30,206.45. However, Voest-Alpine informed
the court of the error and submitted evidence indicating that it actually incurred
$38,380.00 in attorney fees. (R. 1074; 1063)
Additionally, the issue of attorney fees will have to be remanded to the trial court
so that the it may determine the amount of fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in
this appeal.
9

Here, the trial court made no such findings. As it stands, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the trial court considered the evidence submitted by Voest-Alpine supporting
its request for $38,380.00. Furthermore, there is nothing to support the trial court's
reduction of the amount Voest-Alpine requested.
Voest-Alpine submits that the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the
amount of attorney fees requested by Voest-Alpine. "Where the evidence supporting the
reasonableness of the attorney fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed, the court
abuses its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested unless reduction is
warranted by one or more of the factors described in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764
P.2d 985, 987-91." Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213, 220 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).6 Here, the
evidence submitted to the trial court supports an award of $38,380.00. Mountain States
does not contend that this amount is unreasonable. Accordingly, unless the trial court
reduced the award pursuant to the one or more of Dixie factors, the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding less than the amount requested by Voest-Alpine.
This Court should remand the issue to the trial court with instructions to review the

6

The Dixie factors include: the legal work actually performed; the reasonable
necessity of the legal work to adequately prosecute the matter; the consistency of the
attorney's billing with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services;
and any circumstances requiring the consideration of other factors, such as those listed in
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990
(Utah 1988). Notably, clerical error is not a basis for reducing an attorney fee award.
10

amount requested by Voest-Alpine, to review the evidence in support of the award, and
make findings which explain the factors which the trial court considers relevant in
making the award.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's holding that the lease commenced on
March 1, 1994, and find that because Mountain States failed to deliver possession of the
building to Voest-Alpine, Voest-Alpine was not obligated to secure the insurance
required under the lease until such time as Mountain States delivered possession of the
building to Voest-Alpine. Additionally, this Court should remand the issue of attorney
fees to the trial court with instructions to review the amount requested by Voest-Alpine;
to review the evidence submitted by Voest-Alpine; and to make findings explaining the
basis for the trial court's award.
DATED this J ^ f d a y of September, 2001.
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
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Attorneys for Appellee and Cross-Appellant
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